PRAGMATISM, NATURE, AND NORMS

WILLIAM C. FREDERICK

If ethicists are to reach the business mind and thereby influence business decisions and policies, their ideas and theories need to be framed in ways that are meaningful and compelling within the workplace where those decisions and policies are made. Failure to acknowledge this necessary step has kept many an ethically appealing idea from penetrating to the core of business consciousness. The practitioner's innermost cognitive regions are keenly attuned to the immediate setting where problems continually intrude, whether from competitive pressures, government regulations, technological uncertainties, employer/union demands, consumer protests, environmental/ecological events, or myriad stakeholder pressures. Keeping the firm afloat, guiding it toward multiple, diverse goals, discovering new opportunities, striving for sustenance, growth, and continuity rightly occupy the business mind. In a word, problems are necessarily uppermost in the practitioner's thinking, for that is the nature of business activity and those problems constitute the day-to-day experiential setting for the business practitioner.

PRAGMATISM

If we ask which philosophical pathway is most likely to lead ethics analysis into this problem-generating, experiential business arena, and which one is uniquely more capable than others of touching the core of the practitioner's problem-solving focus and interest,
the question almost answers itself. Pragmatism, or perhaps one should say American pragmatism, has long been known as the premier problem- and experience-oriented inquiring discipline.\(^1\)

Neither virtue ethics, Kantian ethics, Rawlsian ethics, natural law ethics, or conventional utilitarian ethics takes problems and experience to be a primary focus of inquiry. Nor have they collectively or individually been notably successful in coping with the kinds of problems, including those displaying an ethical dimension, encountered on a daily basis by business practitioners. One can detect a sense of frustration and disappointment, or even despair, arising from these establishment ethicists that their preferred ethical remedies are so frequently rejected, or worse, simply ignored by the practitioner class.

If getting into the business mind calls for an ethics of problem solving, a pragmatist view becomes the starting point of a dialogue between ethicists and practitioners, each seeking ways to confront and resolve business problems in an ethically acceptable manner that simultaneously acknowledges and comes to terms with the economizing needs and constraints operative within the business firm. Though the beginning point, pragmatism need not be the sole ethical approach that can be employed. Once a pragmatist entry has been gained into the problem-generating workplace, the application of Kantian rights principles or Rawlsian justice concepts or a virtue-based character orientation may prove to be quite helpful. In other words, if ethics analysis is first rooted firmly within the realm of practitioner experience where problems arise, and if pragmatism’s insistence on viewing those problems as amenable to intelligent analysis is sustained throughout the dialogue between ethicist and practitioner, it is possible to envision a multi-headed ethical approach where the best of the various schools can participate. A similar point is made by Andrew Wicks and Edward Freeman who, in speaking of organizational purpose elicited by pragmatic analysis, say: “Once researchers establish that the question of purpose is relevant, the ethics literature—particularly in business ethics—can provide them with an array of research which can help to facilitate detailed analysis of these questions.”

The emphasis here upon the use of human intelligence to understand and perhaps to resolve problems should not be confused with the neoclassical economics notion of rationality or with utilitarian thinking. The business brain is as richly expressive of positive and negative emotions, impulses as any other, so that economic rationality with pragmatism can enhance decision making, and perhaps even come to resemble the utilitarian view. Neither attempts to resolve problems are

Nor is pragmatism methodologically a utilitarian thinking of the sort and Freeman again concludes that pragmatism is not a panacean for utilitarian principles, when he says: “utilitarianism . . . demands only that one should take into account the consequences . . . A panacean well worth mastering is

In the pragmatist view, managers and employees are coping with everyday actions. Past experience, it provides an historical perspective to today’s business problems. This historical continuity with today’s business problems is well worth mastering. This historical continuity with today’s business problems is well worth mastering. This historical continuity with today’s business problems is well worth mastering.
Pragmatism, or perhaps one has long been known as the oriented inquiring discipline. Rawlsian ethics, natural law ethics takes problems and inquiry. Nor have they collectively successful in coping with the displaying an ethical dimension in business practitioners. One and disappointment, or even unshaken ethical theories that their familiar, or worse, approaches for an ethics of problem-solving as a starting point of a dialogue seek ways to confront an ethically acceptable manner and comes to terms with the operative within the business pragmatism need not be the sole need. Once a pragmatist entry operating workplace, the application justice concept or prove to be quite helpful. In rooted firmly within the realm of business, problems arise, and if pragmatic-frameworks as amenable to the dialogue between the ability to envision a multi-headed view. Various schools can participate. Andrew Wicks and Edmond Duggan’s human intelligence to understand should not be confused with rationality or with utilitarian principles. The pragmatist view is richly expressive of positive and negative emotions, irrational urges, and problem-irrelevant impulses as any other, so one should not equate a putative economic rationality with pragmatic intelligence. Emotions may indeed enhance decision making, as claimed by Robert Frank, and in that sense the pragmatist would consider them to be just one more component of the experiential context in which the business practitioners attempts to resolve problems by intelligent means.

Nor is pragmatic method synonymous with the narrow brand of utilitarian thinking often used by business practitioners. Wicks and Freeman again concur: "...the pragmatic criterion of value is not a pseudonym for utilitarianism." Though utilitarians inhabit large regions of most business firms, the ethical harm they do is more a function of their short-range, socially constricted view than of the limited but potentially useful intelligence they display. Utilitarian principles, when applied within a broad realm of business and societal experience, can be one part of a pragmatic approach to ethics issues within business because of their consequentialist focus. Business ethicist Richard DeGeorge has written that "Utilitarianism ... demands careful, objective, impartial evaluation of consequences. ... A powerful tool of moral reasoning, it is a technique well worth mastering."

In the pragmatist view, norms of behavior in business are generated within an ongoing organizational context where decision makers are coping with everyday, ordinary problems occurring as a result of organization-environment (or business and society) interactions. Past experience, including successes as well as failures, provides an historical process or continuum for thinking about today’s business problems. Conventions and traditions based upon this historical continuity will have accumulated over time, acting as guides and rules of thumb for taking actions and moving the firm toward its goals and purposes. Thus, norms are a function of past experience as well as of newly generated information applied to present problems. This kind of norm-generating, experience-based, problem-solving activity is the ground from which operational business values emerge and become behavioral guides for business practitioners.

Stakeholder theory makes clear that this value-forming experiential process extends well beyond the firm’s boundaries. The problems that companies encounter, as well as the values that guide business decisions, are an outcome of firm-and-environment
interactions across a broad range of interests, markets, societies, cultures, and communities. The resultant value-mix becomes more diverse and complex as a function of the environment’s diversity and complexity. The experiential base of operations expands, and the pragmatic search for satisfying outcomes becomes more complex and more difficult because it encompasses a greater variety of values (social, political, religious, ethical) that must be incorporated into the rules and norms that guide business decisions and policies.

To summarize, norms and values used by business practitioners are organizationally and societally contextual, are derived from operational experience, and are used as decisional guides for solving business problems and seeking business opportunities. Appeals to the moral consciousness of business practitioners that fall outside these defining components are not likely to be heard or, if heard, to be heeded.

NATURE

When linked to nature, pragmatism becomes an enormously powerful analytic approach to ethics problems and issues within business. The bridge between pragmatism and nature is the self-same experiential context that defines the practitioner’s problem-solving and problem-seeking working world.

If values emerge from human encounters with the world in which they live, then surely nature has played and continues to play a leading role in that interplay of human organism and environment. For over 2.5 million years of human evolution, our ancestors have interacted closely and successfully with natural forces, solving life’s most basic problems of survival, sustenance, and continuity.* Humans, along with all other organisms, have been caught up in a process of natural selection where adjustment to the environment is the crucial key to adaptation and perpetuation of the species. provisioning, procreation, caring for the young, organizing for cooperative endeavors, learning protections against nature’s many irregular forces while exploiting its seasonal rhythms, finding reassurance through group cohesiveness reinforced by clan and tribal rituals—all of these encounters with the natural world have sustained the human enterprise. They constitute the essential evolutionary experiences of existence. It is through the unforfeited such human practices have emerged and flourishing. James Q. Wilson most basic moral orientations stem from by natural selection. As such, the raw materials from which values practical but unwritten rules are conceptualized as “values” with significance, a developmental process.

Business ethicist Roger Bauman and Sandra Rosenthal have proposed that valuing experiences are taught by context of organism-environmentality of values which emerge from the richness of the natural world. These valuing experiences in natural environments, as often have been built, ice ages have risen and fallen, atmospheric changes waxed and waned, and the earthed by nature’s fury and blessed with —only another form of nature—mental rhythms, varying in their nature presents and to build up Natural scientist-physiologist Ed that “History followed different courses of differences among peoples” because of biological differences value systems of human culture because they evolved from, the carriers successfully to the natural

Ecologists refer to these such that all surviving organisms find surrounding environment. So too sociocultural niches—capable, sociocultural niches are actively, they form communities
evolutionary experiences of early (and present day) human existence. It is through the un forgiving process of natural selection that such human practices have emerged as tested means of surviving and flourishing. James Q. Wilson has argued that many of our most basic moral orientations stem from behavioral patterns driven by natural selection. As such, these human patterns become the raw materials from which values are formed, first taking the form of practical but unwritten rules and group norms and only later being conceptualized as "values" with prescriptive and descriptive significance, a developmental process described more fully in Derry et al.

Business ethicist Rogene Buchholz and pragmatist philosopher Sandra Rosenthal have proposed a similar view: "Value and valuing or valuing experiences are traits of nature; novel emergents in the context of organism-environment interaction. Humans have a plurality of values which emerge from their organic embeddedness in the richness of the natural world." Over the long arc of human existence, these valuing experiences have varied across a broad range of natural environments, as continents have shifted, mountain ranges have been built, ice ages have come and gone, coastal lands have risen and fallen, atmospheric temperatures and pressures have waxed and waned, and the earth has been alternately torn asunder by nature's fury and blessed with nature's bounty. Human cultures—only another form of nature—have tracked these natural environmental rhythms, varying in their ability to withstand the worst that nature presents and to build upon the best of nature's offerings. Natural scientist-physiologist Jared Diamond has recently argued that "History followed different courses for different peoples because of differences among peoples' [geographical] environments, not because of biological differences among peoples themselves." The value systems of human cultures across the globe are centered in, because they evolved from, the necessities of adapting their human carriers successfully to the natural world.

Ecologists refer to these successes as niche building, meaning that all surviving organisms find special ways to fit into their surrounding environment. So too do human organisms build niches—sociocultural niches—capable of sheltering and sustaining families, clans, tribes, societies, and groupings of all these. When sociocultural niches are accumulated and brought together interactively, they form communities of humans living within natural
environments. These ecosystems then become the natural setting where the business drama is played out, as well as comprising the broader realm of evolutionary, sociocultural experience from which business values are drawn.

In the course of human evolution driven by natural selection pressures, the key norms acquire both a workable, practical, useful, i.e., pragmatic, meaning, as well as a moral significance. The workability of norms is a test of their contribution to human adaptiveness and niche building, and they become valued for meeting this test set by natural selection. Over time, those norms that guide and shape group behavior—mating, birthing, rearing the young, preserving the family and clan, cooperative provisioning, defense against predators—become proven methods of group survival and sustenance. As established habits and socially approved customs, they may slowly acquire an insinuated moral tone traceable ultimately to the prevailing beliefs about their efficacy in preserving group cohesiveness, and hence, group survival. This imputed morality may persist even where the relation between norm and survivability is difficult, if not impossible, to establish or demonstrate. Natural forces and events have always been, and remain today, hard to understand and are impossible to predict with precision, given their nonlinear character. Hence, many established and socially inherited moral norms having little to do with human adaptiveness may be embraced ardently. An example is given by biologist Edward O. Wilson: "... the melanges of moral reasoning employed by modern societies are, to put the matter simply, a mess. They are chimeras, composed of odd parts stuck together. Paleolithic egalitarian and tribalistic instincts are still firmly installed. As part of the genetic foundation of human nature, they cannot be replaced. In some cases, such as quick hostility to strangers and competing groups, they have become generally ill adapted and persistently dangerous."12

Naturalist norms in the business world have historically been formed from the same gene-based, in-group, tribalistic perspective cited by Wilson, for that has been the natural pathway taken by the economizing impulse that drives all business activity.13 These core business values are part of the "mess" of moral reasoning. They compete with other values, some personal, others social, still others ethnic, and yet others broadly global. From this rolling stewpot of competing values, business ethicists have long sought to snatch the choicest moral morsels, the moral flavors and tastes favored optimizing business of plenty.

So it is with the recent ideas of business ethics philosopher Thomas (1999). Their twofold aim is, first, to sort through the ethical debris and to conform their decisions to deeply held moral principles, and, second, to codify today's high-tech, global, multi-faceted business activities. From a pragmatist point of view, the business world is understood to be organized around activity, not experience, socially malleable, rooted, pluralistic, politically and organizationally diverse. Business ethics is about community, behavioral guides in a complex social world, and derived from the resources of social consensus and pluralistic institutions. Even the most morally compelling resolutions to ethical problems. Social consensus is the process by which commonly held institutions and social forces are built up and refined. Barnett and director of the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research. Even the most morally compelling resolutions to ethical problems. Social consensus is the process by which commonly held institutions and social forces are built up and refined. Barnett and director of the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research.
the natural setting as well as comprising the vital experience from which

been by natural selection workable, practical, use

a moral significance. The con

tribution to human adap-

tion are valued for meeting

thing, rearing the young, care

ing for the aged, defense

of group survival and the

socially approved customs,

moral tone traceable ultime-

ty and their efficacy in preserving

survival. This imputed

relation between norm and

sense, to establish or demon-

strate, is always been, and remains

possible to predict with preci-

gence. Hence, many established

nothing to do with human

instincts. An example is given by

the various stages of moral reasoning

put the matter simply, a

moral idea stuck together.

Instincts are still firmly

on human nature, they

such as quick hostility to

have become generally ill

adapted to the world have historically been

and social, and the

rivalry between natural pathway taken by the

business activity. These core

elements of moral reasoning. They

in basic, others social, still oth-

ers.

From this rotating stave of

have long sought to snatch

the choicest moral maxims, the ones that are the essence of the

moral flavors and tastes favored by all who feast at business’s econ-

omizing table of plenty.

So it is with the recent ideas of legal scholar Thomas Dunfee and

business ethics philosopher Thomas Donaldson in Ties That Bind

(1999). Their twofold aim is, first, to give business practitioners a

way to sort through the ethical dilemmas they face in the workplace

and to conform their decisions to mankind’s most central and

deeply felt moral principles, and, second, to offer business ethics

a new/old way to define what ethics is and how to apply ethics in

today’s high-tech, global, multicultural workplace.

From a pragmatist point of view, there is much to celebrate here.

Morals are understood to be contextual, the products of human

experience, socially malleable, changeable over time, community

rooted, pluralistic, politically conditioned, transcultural but less

than universally absolute, workable efficient in sustaining human

communities, behavioral guides for people coping with one another

in a social world, and derived from both sociocultural and natural

sources. Community-based norms, including many of those that

guide business operations, are grounded in practices that have met

the test of time in coping with a wide variety of human and social

problems. Social consensus establishes their authority where

pluralistic institutions permit dissent, consent, and withdrawal.

Even the most morally compelling ethical norms, the cleverly but

unfortunately-named “hypernorms,” are said to have their origin in

shared transcultural experiences where there has been a con-

vergence of views about rights and wrongs and where “collective

agreements” concerning various problems have emerged.

A pragmatist would be hard pressed to state the case more force-

fully. It is odd then that these two otherwise well-informed ethicists

do not seem to be aware that they have been “speaking pragmat-

ism” all along. The index does not have an entry for pragmatism

nor for any of the heavyweight pragmatic philosophers such as

Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, George H. Mead, or

Richard Rorty; and one of America’s leading pragmatists, Sandra

Rosemblith, is labeled a “non-philosopher” (page 12) and vanished

from the index, perhaps a casualty of the publisher’s careless copy

editing. The philosophic focus of the authors is clearly in another

direction, which may explain why their otherwise fruitful approach

drawn fire from some like-minded philosopher critics who
share their philosophical preconceptions but not their particular interpretation of conventional writ.

**FICTION VERSUS EXPERIENCE**

It may indeed distress the authors to hear that the trouble lies in the main conceptual vehicle they employ: the social contract, attached as it is in this case to Kantian rights and Rawlsian justice. Other commentators may wish to deal with this objection in the sophisticated political detail the issues deserve, while the view expressed here will be more blunt and direct, perhaps naively so. The social contract is at best a device for thinking through ethics issues in a manner that has little or nothing to do with the actual world of experience in which those issues arise. It is entirely artificial. Social contracts in the sense used by the authors do not exist as tangible agreements. They float free of actual human (and business) practice. Unlike actual, legally binding contracts, these imaginary ones impose upon the “contractors” various morally obligatory provisions to which they have not necessarily consented, analogous to the “fine print” often overlooked as agreements are signed. To their credit, Professors Donaldson and Dunfee refer to the hypothetical nature of social contracts but then just as frequently seem to rely what can exist only in imagination. Though willing to abandon a strict Rawlsian original position where nothing is known by the contractors about their own interests, they retain the idea of “rational, knowledgeable” actors who sit around and decide what is morally acceptable and what is not (pages 26-28). This non-behavioral, non-experiential, non-contextual approach finds no support in social science where explanations of human behavior turn on the closely knit patterns of social interaction among fallible, less-than-perfectly rational people who together comprise human communities whose present state is very much a function of past history, much of it flawed by misjudgments and irrationalities of many varieties. One wants to ask if the analytic gains of employing totally unrealistic assumptions about the nature of human behavior outweigh the costs of the distorted answers produced by such analysis.

Once ethics analysis is lifted clear of the workplace context where values are formed and operationalized, there is a breach between experience and moral concept, between the practitioner and the moral principal. The “social contract” is at best a device that permits the importation of contextual ethics ideas and notions of justice and autonomy at that gap between abstract ideas and where so much business ethics analysis is done without any clear understanding of the moral communities cannot be replicated. The vital, growing sense of the incorporation of abstract primordial into which the moral beliefs and ideas are woven in the very conditions of human experience.

It is therefore ironic that one of the best illustrations of the commodification of That Bird, and the feature that, as it is often described, is its extensive reliance on its ethic of “microsocial contracts” that permits moral flexibility to people operating within, widely varying socio-cultural boundaries, themselves appear in confronting large-scale social problems such as sustainable development, or societal evolution. The practical exigencies faced by abstracted moral principles are
experience and moral concept, between the lived life of the business practitioner and the moral principles he or she is being urged to adopt. The "social contract" in this way acts as a conceptual device that permits the importation of all kinds of non-experiential, non-contextual ethics ideas and notions that may, but probably will not, capture the attention of the business decision maker. It is precisely at that gap between abstract concept and workplace experience where so much business ethics analysis goes astray. Business ethicists need to understand that "... the resolution of conflicting moral communities cannot be resolved by appeal to abstract principles. ... The vital, growing sense of moral rightness comes not from the incursion of abstract principles, but from attunement to the way in which moral beliefs and practices must be rooted naturally in the very conditions of human existence."

It is therefore ironic that one of the very great strengths of Ties That Bind, and the feature that qualifies it as a compelling contribution, is its extensive reliance on the very idea that "moral beliefs and practices must be rooted naturally in the very conditions of human existence." Surely that is the guiding spirit of the community-based norms of "microsocial contracts" and of the "moral free space" that permits moral flexibility to peoples living within, and firms operating within, widely varying sociocultural traditions. Many of the hypenorms themselves appear to be an outgrowth of shared experiences in confronting large-scale, transcultural moral choices. So too is stakeholder management seen as pragmatically responsive to the prevalence of moral understandings in the various sociopolitical locales where corporations conduct business.

With such (unacknowledged) commitment to pragmatist principles, what holds this theory back from a thoroughgoing plunge into pragmatist analysis? To this question there are two answers. One is the lingering grip on the philosophic imaginations of these two scholars of Kantian rights and Rawlsian justice—neither concept consistent with social science theories of human behavior, moral development, or societal evolution nor with natural science theories of evolutionary psychology. Here is the source of the non-contextual, non-experiential abstractions that are inserted into that gap between lived experience and analytic concept, between the practical exigencies faced by business practitioners and the abstracted moral principles they are exhorted to follow.
A clue to the second answer is found in the reluctance of ISCT’s inventors to identify the source of hypernorms, probably traceable to their fear of falling into the infamous naturalistic fallacy where lived experience, or its description, is believed to be an erroneous source of moral values, i.e., no “is” can produce an “ought.” Absent a tangible source for the most important class of normative standards, reliance on hypernorms verges on commitment to what might conversely be called the “philosophistic fallacy” wherein abstract, non-experiential moral principles are imposed on individuals, organizations, and communities, i.e., an “ought” attempts to produce a desired “is.” It is just here that pragmatism is turned aside in favor of inferred abstract principles that reflect conventional philosophic categories and do not speak to the problem-oriented needs of the business practitioner. The business decision maker seeks workable solutions, i.e., “oughts” responsive to all of the “is” forces that converge in the workplace, not just those favored by philosophic convention.

Norms of all varieties can have no other origin than as manifestations of a natural evolutionary development in which humans, their groups, and their variegated ways of life are embedded. The norms (or values) that are meaningful to business, and that define it, emerged as part of this long-term developmental process. The central economizing impulses were laid down in neural circuits long, long ago, as were the power-dominance modes of seeking economizing goals, along with the reciprocal social exchanges that eventually became the framework of market economies and led to contemporary beliefs in distributive justice.17 Beyond the evident and immediate sociocultural environment—and containing it—is the natural environment. Modern business—its habits, practices, goals, and values—is an outgrowth of and an active participant in this tangle blend of nature and what humans have made of its basic forces. There one finds the experiential base from which business practitioners view the world and to which they must be responsive.

One can take heart that business’s dedicated economizing impulses are not the whole story that emerges from nature’s garden. Humans are the inheritors of a vast melange of nature-conditioned impulses, values, and norms as shaped by several millennia of sociocultural experimentation and learning.18 These include cooperative impulses, consensus building, common ways of thinking about and resolving problems, altruistic caring, social exchanges, and forging commitment inclusive of kin. Together, these brain circuits to support the community life. Laid down over 300,000 years ago, they are as securely implanted as any other economizing practices. Both economize and community is of central importance. Both have evolved over time, varying with time, place, and human understanding.

Puzzling out the relations that becomes the essence of moral dilemma, no final answers are to be found principles. There is only continuous learning that draws upon human understanding of the ways and the values by which the world as it is found, which is a part of that enterprise can serve.

Authors should not be fallible as abstractions, but as capable of understanding their own insight and the need for theoretical foundation the field of organizational behavior. The past two decades or more have been intended to suggest that the field is significantly more analytic potential. A relatively small step into this potential in ways that would be productive for business ethics.

After all is said and done, there is one more day take satisfaction in the prediction of the fourth stage of critical realist scientific theory (as quoted in the critical realist sense; (i) this is an interesting project; (ii) this is true, but quite important.
found in the reluctance of ISCT’s hypernorms, probably traceable naturalistic fallacy where it is, believed to be an erroneous 

exchanges, and forging community ties of sentiment and affection inclusive of non-kin. Together, they form a human ecology of community life. Laid down over a period exceeding 2 million years, brain circuits to support these ecologizing behavioral patterns are as securely implanted as those circuits giving expression to economizing practices. Both kinds of behaviors—self-centered economizing and community-centered ecologizing—are products of natural selection. Both have contributed to human survival and flourishing. Neither is “superior” to the other. They work sometimes in tandem and other times competitively in all ecosystems. The boundary between economizing and ecologizing is a shifting line, varying with time, place, ecosystem dynamics, technology, and human understanding.

Puzzling out the relations between these two natural forces becomes the essence of moral analysis. In that search, there are no final answers to be found, no ultimate rules, no absolute principles. There is only continued experimentation and continuous learning that draws upon human intelligence in coping with the world as it is found, which is the pragmatist program for eliciting the ways and the values by which the human enterprise can thrive and business enterprise can serve human purposes.

Authors should not be faulted for not writing the book that their critics would have preferred them to write. *Ties That Bind* quite capably stands on its own merits as the most interesting and fruitful theoretical initiative the field of business ethics has seen during the past two decades or more. The observations offered here have been intended to suggest that the book’s central theme possesses significantly more analytic potential than the authors have tapped. A relatively small step into the world of nature would release that potential in ways that would benefit both the theory and practice of business ethics.

After all is said and done, the authors of *Ties That Bind* might one day take satisfaction in biologist J. B. S. Haldane’s wry description of the four stages of critical reaction to any newly proposed scientific theory (quoted in Calvin, 1996): “(i) this is worthless nonsense; (ii) this is an interesting, but perverse, point of view; (iii) this is true, but quite unimportant; (iv) I always said so.”
NOTES

4. Wicks and Freeman, 129.